Reconciling Rules of Origin and Global Value Chains: The Case for Reform by Carroll, Colleen et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Working Paper No. 137 – April 2014 
 
RECONCILING RULES OF ORIGIN AND GLOBAL VALUE 
CHAINS: THE CASE FOR REFORM 
 
Colleen Carroll 
Dylan Geraets 
Arnoud R. Willems 
 
 
 
 
2 
RECONCILING RULES OF ORIGIN AND GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: THE CASE FOR REFORM 
Colleen Carroll 
Dylan Geraets 
Arnoud R. Willems  
 
ABSTRACT 
Rules of Origin (ROO) are in need of reform. Aside from being used for protectionist purposes, 
they have also become so complicated that they result in companies foregoing trade 
preferences granted by preferential agreements on a substantial scale. This paper makes the 
argument for a fundamental reconceptualization of ROO, based on today’s Global Value Chains 
(GVCs). The paper is divided in four sections. First, it surveys the methods currently applied for 
assigning origin. Existing obstacles to reform are then outlined. A third section briefly examines 
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1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE ROO PICTURE 
 
When implementing customs and trade policies and setting tariffs with trading partners, nothing 
is more important than knowing where goods originate. Rules of Origin (ROO) provide a set of 
procedures for determining this location and work to ensure that only selected trading partners 
benefit from tariffs installed via trade agreements. But while intended to facilitate international 
trade and keep free riders from profiting unwarrantedly from free trade areas, ROO have 
backfired. Not only are they increasingly abused for protectionist purposes — most 
controversially for the imposition of anti-dumping duties —, but also so muddled that companies 
either forego preferences to which they are legitimately entitled or decline to trade with 
producers in countries where they would otherwise benefit from comparative advantage. In both 
cases, production costs rise and consumers suffer.   
 
Current ROO date back to the 1950s and determine origin predominantly on the (presumably 
single) location of manufacturing and assembly.  But as the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
describes it, products are no longer made in a single country, but rather are “Made in the World.” 
The trend toward ‘global factories,’ where products are produced in multiple steps and locations, 
vitiates the practice of focusing on one location of ‘final manufacturing’. Classifying final goods 
proves complicated, as manufacturing and processing occur across vertically integrated 
companies spanning the globe and intermediate goods for one product might be a final good 
sold by a subsidiary. Moreover, the steps of R&D, design, development, and marketing increase 
a product’s value such that as little as 10% of its total value might be added in the country where 
the “end product” is manufactured.  
 
The obvious solution to these problems is reform. Historically, attempts to reform, simplify, or 
harmonize ROO have surfaced only at the multilateral level. However, multilateral approaches 
have reached an impasse since the Agreement on ROO at the end of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations of the GATT in 1994.  After that, the focus shifted to preferential ROO and as a 
result, the most important ROO are now established in Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) or 
PTAs signed between states, each with unique specifications. While this shift to bilateral and 
plurilateral agreements has resulted in an increasing complexity of ROO, it also creates 
opportunities to explore new approaches. The best way forward may be to apply 
reconceptualized. 
 
Overhauling ROO and instead focusing on the total supply chain can help recapture the benefits 
of trade liberalization. Producers can again make rational decisions about where to locate 
manufacturing and assembly, source materials, and place R&D and marketing activities. As the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the WTO and the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) stated in a joint report for the G20 
Summit in Saint Petersburg, “trade agreements have to cope with the new reality of business.” 
5 
Reformed ROO might contribute to making Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) more ‘GVC-
friendly’ and increasing their impact on the productivity of countries and companies.1   
 
Cognizant of the current global business and political conditions, this paper argues that reform 
must go beyond pragmatic steps such as harmonization or ‘rebalancing’. Instead, a fundamental 
reconceptualization of ROOs is needed based on today’s global value chains (GVCs).2 To make 
a convincing case for reform, this paper proceeds in four successive sections. First, it surveys 
the methods currently applied for assigning origin. Existing obstacles to reform are then outlined. 
A third section briefly examines previous attempts at reforming ROO. Fourth, the contours and 
possible ramifications of a value-added approach to determining origin are explored, given that 
(a) ROO are not suitable for today’s world characterized by GVCs; and (b) the tension between 
bilaterally established rules and multilateral decision-making continues to hamper attempts at 
harmonization or reform.  
 
2. WHAT ARE RULES OF ORIGIN, AND HOW IS ORIGIN DETERMINED?    
 
ROO are key components of a state’s customs and trade policies designed to identify a 
manufactured product’s location of origin. They exist to facilitate exchange between countries 
partner to an RTA or PTA, as a good originating in a country party to the agreement is taxed at a 
lower rate at the border; they simultaneously deflect non-partner country goods from profiting 
from the favorable tariff rates. ROO exist “not to make life complicated or miserable for exporters 
or importers, but…. to ensure that only qualified parties and products benefit from the RTA and 
there are no Free Riders.”3  In this light, the raison d'être of ROO has been described as 
differentiated restrictions on international trade,4 pending universal liberalization and eventual 
elimination of barriers. Discussions about ROO cannot be separated from efforts to harmonize 
trade policy and to liberalize trade on a global scale. 
 
ROO determine the tariff levied on each product imported into a country, they facilitate trade 
statistics, and support a multitude of other trade-related policies. Though ensconced via political 
decision-making, ROOs influence investment and sourcing decisions at the firm level. ROO can 
be used to create conditions needed to ensure that partnering countries benefit from preferential 
tariff schemes. However, sound or universal application of the rules is difficult because the 
outdated geographical distinctions embedded in ROO confer different tariffs on, or treatments of, 
imported goods.  Determining origin has also proven controversial because the application of 
ROO fluctuates widely from state to state and from agreement to agreement, and because the 
system for determining ‘originating’ and ‘non-originating’ products is so complex. 
  
Importantly, ROO are divided into two distinct types: preferential ROO and non-preferential 
ROO, the latter also referred to as ‘economic origin’. Preferential and non-preferential origin can 
be calculated and applied quite differently (often at the same time), leading to different scenarios 
in which a variety of actors — importers, exporters, customs officials, various producers in a 
production chain, etc. — are impacted in divergent ways. As the name indicates, preferential 
rules of origin are used to determine whether a product originates in a country with which the 
importing country has concluded a PTA or RTA. Hirsch explains: “ROO are primarily designed to 
                                               
1
 G20, “Implications of Global Value Chains for Trade, Investment, Development and Jobs”, Joined Report by the OECD, WTO, 
UNCTAD, 6 August 2013, p. 19. 
2
 Sébastien Mirodout and Dorothée Rouzet (2013), ‘Trade Policy Implications of Global Value Chains: Contribution to the Report on 
Global Value Chains’, OECD, TAD/TC/WP(2012)31/FINAL, at 28. See also Olivier Cadot and Jaime de Melo (2008), “Why OECD 
Countries Should Reform Rules of Origin”, World Bank Research Observer, (23) (1), 77-105. 
3
 Ann Van de Heetkamp and Ruud Tusveld (2011a), “Why Is this Complex?”, Origin Management, Springer Publishing, Heidelberg, 
pg. 183-190 at 183. 
4
 Edwin Vermulst, Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments – Revisited, 1992 Journal of World Trade (26)(6), 61-102 at 61. 
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facilitate trade liberalization through reciprocal arrangements. This method is widely 
implemented through the conclusion of preferential agreements intended to allow trade 
concessions only to the contracting parties, while maintaining existing barriers towards non-
contracting parties.”5 Non-preferential ROO, on the other hand, are used to justify less-favored 
treatment for non-contracting parties. At the risk of oversimplifying, preferential ROO qualify a 
product for a benefit whereas non-preferential ROO target a product for a penalty.  
 
In theory, proper deployment of both types of ROO would appropriately modulate trade flows, 
rewarding trade partners while still allowing states party to an RTA to execute external tariffs on 
goods from non-agreement countries. In practice, however, this complex system has abetted 
harmful activities such as protectionist policy-making and costly trade diversion and deflection. 
To understand how, we need to understand how each type of ROO defines the origin of a 
product.  
 
A. PREFERENTIAL RULES OF ORIGIN 
 
Preferential ROOs generally confer preferential treatment on a product based on one or any 
combination of the following four rules, all of which are spelled out in the Free Trade Agreement 
to which both states are party. Origin is conferred if (i) the product is identified as wholly 
obtained within a partner country, meaning that all products involved in the final good are 
sourced from countries party to this RTA. Alternatively, (ii) origin is assigned where the 
transformation of the exported product in RTA countries increases its value, or a significant 
transformation of the product is completed within the partnering countries. Another rule (iii) is the 
“Change of Tariff Classification”; this means that a product “originates” in the country where the 
Harmonized System (“HS”) code of the manufactured product differs from the HS codes of its 
components. 6 , 7  This Change of Tariff Classification test is the most frequently applied for 
determining preferential origin. Because every RTA contains its own set of rules for origin 
determination, and because HS codes are continuously amended, producers must constantly re-
evaluate sourcing and production patterns, as fluctuations in HS codes trigger fluctuations in 
prices of production materials and associated costs.8 Moreover, HS classifications, maintained 
by the World Customs Organization (WCO), were not designed with ROO in mind. The fourth 
rule (iv) consists of a specific rule.  Indeed, sometimes, the country of origin can be defined by a 
specific tailor made rule for a product. For example, the EU determined that an electronic 
product such as a radio or video could only originate in the country where the transistor 
originated. However, sometimes it is so difficult to meet the origin test for preferential treatment 
that companies simply abandon the effort, defeating the purpose of the PTA. 
 
                                               
5
 Moshe Hirsch, International Trade Law, Political Economy and Rules of Origin A Plea for a Reform of the WTO Regime on Rules of 
Origin, 2002 Journal of World Trade (36)(2) 171-188, at 177. 
6
 The Harmonized System code (HS code) stems from the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and 
Coding System.
 
This convention was concluded in 1983 with the aim of facilitating trade and enabling the collection of trade related 
statistics. The harmonized system devised by the convention lays down a nomenclature comprising headings and subheadings of 
different goods. The convention obliges contracting parties to make use of the Harmonized System in the application of customs 
tariff and statistical nomenclatures. The six-digit HS codes are contained in HS Nomenclatures that are amended every five years.   
The Revised Kyoto Convention (RKC) entered into force in 2006, and was developed by the successor of the CCC, the World 
Customs Organization (WCO). It specifies in Article 4 of Special Annex K that ‘In applying the substantial transformation criterion, 
use should be made of the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System.’ See World 
Customs Organization, ‘International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (as amended), 
2006.  
7
 Ann Van de Heetkamp and Ruud Tusveld (2011b), “(Rules of) Origin”, Origin Management, Springer Publishing, Heidelberg, pg. 
71-108 at 72-73. 
8
  Stefano Inama (2009a), “Drafting Preferential Rules of Origin,” in Rules of Origin in International Trade, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, p. 426. 
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B. NON-PREFERENTIAL RULES OF ORIGIN 
 
The 1974 International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs 
Procedures (Kyoto Convention), written under the auspices of the Customs Co-operation 
Council (CCC), contains the specifics for determining a product’s non-preferential origin.9 Two 
separate methods are used to determine non-preferential treatment. First, where only one (non-
member) country is involved in the attribution of origin, origin is defined by the country where the 
product is “wholly produced.”10 Second, the country of origin is determined to be the country 
where the “last substantial transformation took place”. The vagueness of the Convention’s 
wording leaves considerable scope for interpretation.11 The Kyoto Convention only serves as a 
guide and lacks any binding power as an international legal instrument; this means the Kyoto 
Convention did not effectively harmonize non-preferential determination, leaving the door open 
to case-by-case abuse of the procedure for protectionist purposes. 12  Resultantly, non-
preferential ROO can lead to de-facto higher tariffs on goods from non-member countries, 
inducing producers or exporters to divert trade patterns to countries with lower tariffs and 
distorting trade. 
 
In addition to the two methods described above, two additional tests can be used to confer non-
preferential origin on a product. First, the country contributing the highest value to a specific 
good’s final value can be designated the product’s country of origin. Second, the country of 
origin for non-preferential goods can be determined by identifying the location where the last 
substantial transformation takes place; this can be “the country where the good changed 
character, was significantly processed, or where final assembly took place.”13 Under the Special 
Committee on Preference’s review of Rules of Origin, definitions of final transformation stemmed 
from standing European Economic Community definitions, where final transformation results in 
“the manufacture of a new product,” or represents “an important state of manufacture.” 14 
Importantly, these tests are generally applied when tests for preferential origin are incapable of 
identifying origin. As with other methods, these tests can be misused. For example, it is possible 
to unfairly penalize a given producer by defining its products as non-preferential through 
incorrect identification of a non-member country of ‘last substantial transformation.’ 
 
Non-preferential origin rules enable straightforward tasks like collecting trade statistics and 
applying labeling and marking requirements. Indeed, “the most common application for non-
preferential rule of origin is arguably labeling.” 15  Non-preferential tariffs are also applied in 
government procurement. However, they can also be invoked for a variety of political purposes, 
such as achieving direct trade outcomes or indirect trade goals. Most controversially, they are 
used to implement anti-dumping duties and safeguard measures.16 In anti-dumping matters, 
non-preferential ROO are relevant both during an anti-dumping investigation and after imposition 
                                               
9
 The Revised Kyoto Convention (RKC) entered into force in 2006, and was developed by the successor of the CCC, the World 
Customs Organization (WCO). It specifies in Article 4 of Specific Annex K that ‘In applying the substantial transformation criterion, 
use should be made of the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System.’ See World 
Customs Organization, ‘International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (as amended), 
2006. 
10
 Article 2 of Specific Annex K., Chapter 1. 
11
 World Customs Organization, ‘Rules of Origin in Kyoto Convention: Definitions, Principles, Standards and Recommended 
Practices’, Available at http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/origin/instrument-and-tools/comparative-study-on-preferential-rules-of-
origin/specific-topics/general-topics/kyoto-topic.aspx (last accessed 17 April 2014). 
12
 Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum and Petros C. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization – Law, Practice, and Policy 
(Second Edition), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, 989p., at 266. 
13
 See van de Heetkamp and Tusveld (2011b), above n 7, at 75. 
14
 Regulation 802/68, from Commission Regulation 2454/93, as quoted in Inama (2009a), above n 8, at 401. 
15
 See van de Heetkamp and Tusveld (2011b), above n 7, at 73. 
16
 See van de Heetkamp and Tusveld (2011b), above n 7 at 71. See also Ivo Van Bael and Jean-François Bellis (2011), 
“Circumvention”, EU Anti-dumping and other Trade Defence Instruments, Kluwer Law International, pg.629-666 at 661. 
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of anti-dumping measures. 17  Investigative authorities may use ROO in the first stage of 
investigation to determine whether dumping is transpiring and whether dumping is causing 
material injury to the domestic industry producing the ‘like’ product; in the second stage, 
producers hit by the anti-dumping duties may decide to relocate their production and initiate or 
increase export from a third country. In order to address this issue of “circumvention” and avoid 
opening a new anti-dumping investigation, the authorities (customs, the European Anti-Fraud 
Office (OLAF), the trade defense unit of the European Commission), “may dispute the origin of 
the products now coming from such countries and conduct an origin investigation.”18  
 
The application of ROOs when executing trade mechanisms like safeguard and anti-dumping 
measures underscores major divisions with the WTO’s Committee on Rules of Origin, wherein 
Members continue pursuing a harmonized set of non-preferential ROOs. Contentions arise 
concerning ROOs in other trade measures, as well, including most-favoured nation treatment, 
countervailing duties, origin marking and labeling, discriminatory quantitative restrictions, 
government procurement, and trade statistics.19 Despite proposals to grant Members permission 
to choose the instruments where ROOs would be applied, harmonization efforts are further 
complicated by diverging views on the identification of rules for the machinery sector. 
Preferences here are split between a rules system rooted in the change of tariff classification 
and a newer approach anchored in value added at each stage of transformation. Efforts remain 
stagnated since 2006, and the Committee cites a lack of political guidance from the WTO’s 
General Council as a primary cause for continuing deadlocks in the harmonization process.20  
 
In the European Union (EU), the Basic Origin Regulation was the first step taken by the EEC to 
harmonize the different non-preferential origin rules prevailing in EC Member States. 21  The 
substantive origin rules provided by the Basic Origin Regulation have been characterized as 
‘extremely succinct and vague.’22 Article 5 of the Regulation provides that:  
 
“a product in the production of which two or more countries were concerned shall be 
regarded as originating in the country in which the last substantial process or operation 
that is economically justified was performed, having been carried out in an undertaking 
equipped for the purpose, and resulting in the manufacture of a new product or 
representing an important stage of manufacture.”  
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has been asked on a number of occasions 
to interpret this particular provision of the European Economic Community (EEC) Basic Origin 
Regulation.23 The resulting body of case law exemplifies the importance of the interpretation of 
terms such as ‘last substantial process’ and ‘important stage of manufacture’. For example, in 
the Brother II case, the Hauptzollamt Giesen ordered Brother to pay 3.2 million Deutsch Mark in 
Anti-Dumping duties because the typewriters did not originate in Taiwan- as Brother had 
                                               
17
 Stefano Inama and Edwin Vermulst (2010), “Nonpreferential Origin Rules in Antidumping Law and Practice”, Law and Economics 
of Contingent Protection in International Trade, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pg. 276-305 at 283. 
18
 Ibid, at 292. 
19
 WTO document G/L/1047, “Report (2013) of the Committee on Rules of Origin to the Council for Trade in Goods,” (2013). 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 802/68 on the common definition of the concept of the origin of goods, O.J. (1968) L 148/165 
[Regulation 802/68 or Basic Origin Regulation]. This Regulation was repealed by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing 
the Community Customs Code, O.J. (1992) L 302. 
22
 Paul Waer, European Community Rules of Origin, in Edwin Vermulst, Paul Waer and Jacques Bourgeois (eds.), Rules of Origin in 
International Trade, 1994, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 501pp., at 98. 
23
 Case 49/76 Gesellschaft für Überseehandel v Handelskammer Kassel [1977] ECR 41 (Überseehandel); Case 114/78 Yoshida 
GmbH v Industrie- und Handelskammer Kassel [1979] ECR 151 (Yoshida); Case 162/82 Criminal proceedings  against Paul Cousin 
and others [1983] ECR 1101 (Cousin); Case 93/83 Zentralgenossenschaft des Fleischgewerbes e.G. v Hauptzollamt Bochum [1984] 
ECR 1095 (Zentrag); and Case 26/88 Brother International GmbH v Hauptzollamt Giesen [1989] ECR 4253 (Brother II). 
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claimed- but rather in Japan. Brother conceded that most of the parts originated in Japan but 
argued that the assembly of the parts in Taiwan constituted a classical operation of 
transformation within the meaning of Article 5 of the Basic Origin Regulation.24 The Court of 
Justice reaffirmed that the decisive criterion in Article 5 of the Basic Origin Regulation is that of 
the ‘last substantial process or operation’. Since Article 5 did not specify the extent to which 
assembly operations could be regarded as a substantial process or operation, the Court relied 
on Rule 6 of the Kyoto Convention, which provides a definition of ‘simple assembly operations’. 
It held that where only two countries are concerned in the production of a good, the mere 
assembly of previously manufactured parts is insufficient to confer origin on the country of 
assembly if the value added in assembly is appreciably less than the value imparted in the other 
country. The Court further added that in situations where the added value of assembly 
constitutes less than 10%, origin cannot be conferred upon the country of assembly in any 
event. 
 
Even for the same product, preferential origin determination may provide very different outcomes 
than those resulting from non-preferential origin determination. As Vermulst notes, “[preferential 
ROO] are completely immaterial for determining whether the same products fall within the scope 
of trade-restrictive measures such as quotas or antidumping duties.”25 Non-preferential methods 
may be used when preferential methods fail, sometimes leading to the identification of multiple 
countries of origin. Interpreting state specific non-preferential ROOs- and as exemplified in the 
Brother case, the spider web of case law stemming from this process- complicates and 
increases the cost of both upholding and complying with the current system of origin rules.  
 
 
3. RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ROO COMPLEXITY — A NEW 
APPROACH 
 
Originally designed to deter non-signatory states from free riding preferential tariff rates installed 
via RTAs, ROO are increasingly one of the most complex mechanisms in international trade. For 
example, numerous RTAs contain different ROO, there are two distinct but overlapping ROO 
types and a plethora of unique situations for applying origin rules, and myriad tests deduce 
appropriate origin classifications; multiple ambiguities and thorny procedures interlinked with 
ROO generate several interrelated problems. The most burdensome of these are threefold: 
trade diversion, the failure of companies to seek preferential status, and protectionist tactics. 
What follows touches briefly on trade diversion and protectionism, but because changes in 
production and consumption patterns have reshaped the conditions for economic exchange, the 
bulk of discussion coalesces around the (under)utilization of preferential terms. 
 
A. TRADE DIVERSION 
 
ROOs can divert exporters and importers from trading with producers in countries where it would 
otherwise be economically advantageous. Van de Heetkamp and Tusveld note that “[o]rigin 
issues are intertwined in compliance, cost-benefit analysis, and sourcing options,” issues that 
increase costs associated with production.26 Heightened costs are absorbed by the business, 
decreasing the firm’s profitability, or (more likely) are passed on to consumers, who then must 
pay a higher price to compensate for fees associated with determining origin or the higher tariff 
rates for non-originating products.  
                                               
24
 Case 26/88 Brother International GmbH v Hauptzollamt Giesen [1989] ECR 4253 (Brother II), para. 15. 
25
 See Vermulst, above n 4, at 80. 
26
 See van de Heetkamp and Tusveld (2011a), above n 3, at 183. 
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B. ROOS AS INSTRUMENTS OF PROTECTIONISM 
 
Hirsch argues that ROO may also be instruments of domestic protectionism: “Generally, as more 
local materials and processes are employed in the manufacturing of a product, the likelihood of 
meeting the origin requirements increases. Thus, the inclusion of more stringent ROOs in a 
preferential agreement generates a greater incentive for producers to use more local materials 
and intermediate components.”27 The presence and concentration of domestic interest groups 
benefitting from the current status quo, then, are an important consideration. Recent trade 
liberalization negotiations conducted by the EU, for example, espouse friction between reducing 
tariffs and use of origin rules. Where tariff reduction schemes bias one country over the other, 
ROOs can be more heavily or closely monitored as a way to protect domestic industries from an 
increasing number of imports. For instance, such a maneuver would allow the automotive 
industry to pressure domestic authorities to more rigorously monitor origin requirements from 
trade partners so that origin of essential car components, such as engines, tires, window glass, 
are accounted for in calculating appropriate tariff rates. The European Automotive 
Manufacturers’ Association issued statements to this degree, demanding equal tariff 
liberalization schedules and unbiased access in agreements negotiated with India and South 
Korea.28,29 
 
C. FOREGOING PREFERENTIAL STATUS AND FAILING TO UTILIZE PTAS 
 
Besides problems of trade diversion and protectionist tactics, ROO may induce companies to 
forego the preferences granted by RTAs. Assuming full utilization of preferences, the 2011 
World Trade Report found that only 16 percent of a sample covering imports of the 20 largest 
importers (excluding intra-EU trade) from all their trading partner countries qualified as 
preferential trade.30  This indicates that preference utilization rates of PTAs are often low. The 
Report also explains that: 
 
“Onerous rules of origin procedures sometimes associated with free trade 
agreements have contributed to these low figures by making the costs of compliance 
requirements higher than the perceived worth of the underlying preference 
margins.”31 
 
Similarly, research carried out by the World Bank showed that for the case of exports of African 
textiles to the EU and the U.S., more flexible and pragmatic ROOs could lead to a major 
increase in exports- there is potential for export volumes four times greater than what could be 
achieved by simply removing tariffs.32 
 
 
 
                                               
27
 Moshe Hirsch (2011), The Politics of Rules of Origin, in Broude, Tomer, Marc L. Busch and Amelia Porges (eds.), The Politics of 
International Economic Law, Cambridge University Press, 317-336. (LOOK UP REF. Used SSRN Paper for now: Mosche Hirsch, 
The Politics of Rules of Origin, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 08-13, June 2013, at 327) 
28
 “EU-South Korea FTA Negotiations: Resolution of Remaining Issues“ (2011) European Automotive Manufacturers’ Association, 
http://www.acea.be//news/news_detail/eu_south_korea_fta/ (last accessed at 17 April 2014) 
29
 “EU-India FTA Negotiations: No Compromise on Zero-for-Zero” (2011), European Automotive Manufacturers’ Association, 
http://www.acea.be//news/news_detail/eu_india_fta/ (last accessed at 17 April 2014) 
30
 WTO, World Trade Report 2011 The WTO and preferential trade agreements: From co-existence to coherence, 256 p. at 7. 
31
 Ibid, at 44. 
32
 Jaime de Melo and Alberto Portugal-Perez, Preferential Market Access Design: Evidence and Lessons from African Apparel 
Exports to the United States and the European Union, The World Bank Economic Review, Advance Access 7 June 2013, at 23.  
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4. COMPLEX RULES LEADS TO UNDERUTILIZATION 
 
Two interrelated characteristics of ROO, however, prompt businesses to ignore preferential 
treatment. First, ROO are complex, and adhering to origin rules can be cumbersome. A detailed 
study into ROO in PTAs revealed that the multiplicity of systems of ROO can be burdensome 
and an impediment to trade.33 This is especially relevant as over the last twenty years, PTAs 
proliferated at an unprecedented rate, each of which contains different preferential ROO. This 
observation was also made by the World Economic Forum, which recognized that: 
 
“PTAs could add to transactions costs in the absence of multilateral disciplines 
advancing in the WTO. Furthermore, PTA rules are based on an antiquated 
understanding of where goods are ‘from’ - hence the Byzantine networks of ‘rules of 
origin.’”34 
 
Technical issues and related compliance challenges, in particular, play an important role in 
discouraging producers from taking advantage of preferences. Producers can face dilemmas 
when trying to obtain appropriate origin evaluation using Harmonized System (HS) codes. 
Producers even of basic goods or raw materials are plagued with reviewing HS codes (and any 
changes) and comparing these codes with the various phases of a good’s production to 
determine whether the possibility exists to keep or obtain originating status. Is it better to 
maintain existing originating classifications for a given product? Or should this classification be 
abandoned and a new origin assignment obtained? As stated above, HS codes serve as the 
primary means of evaluating changes in tariff classification for ROO applications —as 
benchmarks for “originating” and “non-originating” products. However, the system was not 
designed with this purpose in mind; instead, it was constructed to globally synchronize product 
classifications to facilitate trade data collection. 35  The application of these codes to origin 
determination is imperfect. And because the HS is constantly “changing and evolving,” “each 
time a new version enters into force, amendments have to be made to the rules of origin that are 
using the HS.”36  
 
Inama, describing the fishing industry, provides an example indicative of this conundrum, 
illustrating the predicament fisheries have experienced when preparing products for export. If a 
fish is caught, transported to shore, and then cleaned and filleted, has there been a significant 
transformation of the original product? Is the cleaning and filleting of the wild fish enough to 
cause the fish to lose its original tariff classification?37 Must the producer instead apply for a new 
tariff rate for the filleted fish, or are separate tariff rates applicable to the cleaned fish and the 
prepared fish?  
 
ROO between NAFTA countries further exemplify these complexities. Shadikhodjaev mentions 
the Canada–US FTA and the US–Mexico FTA as examples of preferential trading arrangements 
that, because of the unmanageable ROO prescribed within them, prompt companies to forego 
trading benefits.38 The same applies to the ROO prescribed by the European Union Generalized 
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System of Preferences (GSP).39 Applying for ROO among these countries requires an in-depth 
analysis of both the product being traded and the specifics of the ROO defined in the NAFTA 
agreements. Companies within all three countries risk reparation- in addition to non-preferential 
tariff rates- should ROO applications be wrongly prepared. Conditions for preferential treatment 
for any one good, however, vary across agreement partners: in this case, a Mexican company 
applying for preferential tariffs on automotive parts must navigate the US definitions of 
automotive parts as well as the Canadian definition before discerning the degree of product 
transformation and the HS classification of the product post-production processes within the 
Mexican firm. These complexities undermine tariff liberalization schemes established in PTAs 
and RTAs. Several studies have shown that ROO may lead to great difficulties in clearing 
customs, leaving preferences granted under GSP schemes unexploited.40 
 
5. ORIGIN: TARIFF REDUCTION OR INCREASED BUSINESS COSTS? 
 
These complexities underscore a second, related characteristic of ROO that discourages 
utilization of preferential treatment: they are costly to apply. Companies participating in 
international exchange bear the costs of navigating ROO and ensuring compliance with each 
trading country’s specific product classifications. Costs are threefold. First, costs come in the 
form of information required to process various Certificates of Origin. A business manufacturing 
one good (or parts for one good) potentially ship products to clients in multiple locations, 
requiring separate Certificate of Origin applications per each destination. In a recent speech at 
the World Customs Organization, Yoko Uenoyama of Japan’s Panasonic Corporation 
documented her company’s experiences: as manufacturers of hundreds of electronic 
components, equipment and finished across nine types of consumer goods, Panasonic 
cooperates or sells goods to more than 300 companies in 45 overseas countries and regions.41 
However, RTAs with these 45 regions and countries install unique terms for determining a 
product’s origin; value-added, change in tariff classification, change in tariff heading, change in 
tariff sub-heading- any of these methods, or any combination of these methods can be used 
depending on the terms negotiated into the relevant RTA. Costs fall on firms to cope with 
researching appropriate information before applying for Origin status.   
 
Second, assembling apposite information requires a preponderance of time. In the Panasonic 
example, employees must compile information on origin definitions from each pertinent RTA, 
cross check similarities between product definitions and HS codes in the destination country, 
and ensure that no changes to HS codes have occurred. This is a demanding task for any firm, 
costing exuberant amounts of employee hours to cross check products line-by-line against the 
fluctuating origin criteria. The logistics industry, in particular, is hampered by such procedures: 
while technology facilitates rapid movement of goods on a global scale, the time required to 
process all accompanying ROO documentation skews inhibits logistics companies from 
employing advanced transit processes, requires these firms to adjust business models to 
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accommodate processing of origin materials, and delays smooth functioning of global production 
chains.42  
 
Third, firms are liable for all irregularities associated with origin claims. Even after tiptoeing 
through tangled set of origin rules, definitions, and product classifications, origin applications can 
be denied, whether at the border or by customs authorities a posteriori. Where origin is denied, 
investments in Certificates of Origin are lost and business expenses rise. Moreover, firms are 
responsible for the discrepancies between preferential tariff rates and regular tariff rates where 
origin is denied, and authorities can collect these fines retroactively.43 Trade secrets, too, are 
jeopardized: companies must adhere to strict documentation procedures and are financially 
responsible for tariff discrepancies should paperwork be incorrect; however, certificate of origin 
questions purge companies of valuable trade secrets when requesting detailed information 
concerning production processes or supplies.  
 
6. TOWARD A VALUE-ADDED APPROACH 
 
On a more fundamental level, ROO in their current incarnation do not reflect modern production 
processes. As trade becomes cheaper because of reduced transportation costs and improved 
production technologies, it is easier to relocate different stages of the manufacturing process to 
different areas of the world. Goods exchanged across borders, more importantly, are only 
fragments of final goods. “As supply chains go global,” notes Gereffi, “…more intermediate 
goods are traded across borders and more parts and components are imported for use in 
exports.”44  
 
Today, a product’s assembly only accounts for approximately 10% of the total value of the final 
product (e.g. the consumer price) but this 10% determines the applied tariff rate. The remaining 
90% of the final product’s value is not taken into account when determining the origin, and 
therefore the tariff. The Apple iPhone is an example often used in this particular situation. The 
iPhone is designed by Apple, whose headquarters are located in the USA, but manufactured in 
China from components originating form mostly countries other than China. Consequently, under 
applicable ROOs, the origin of the iPhone is conferred upon China. Kraemer, Linden and 
Dedrick show that manufacturing process in China adds as little as 1,8% to the final value of the 
end-product.45 Recall that origin is most often determined using HS codes (a change of tariff 
heading), rather than through any assessment of value. This skews trade statistics, because the 
relative share of raw materials, R&D, intellectual property, and marketing are not factored into 
the total value of the product.46  
 
Consequently, by using HS codes to allocate origin — and therefore tariff treatment —, the 
location of the manufacturing, production or assembly of the product confers on of assembly are 
no longer the most valuable part of the product. Presuming that the country where the most 
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value is from could be the more logical choice for the determination of origin, the question should 
be posed whether policy decisions or economic development are hampered by the current ROO.  
 
A. MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO ROO HARMONIZATION 
 
A broad critique of the flaws and inadequacies of ROO resonates in the international community, 
and multilateral forums have a good track record of discussing ROO reforms. The establishment 
of the ‘substantial transformation’ test, and the Agreement on ROO in 1994 constituted major 
achievements. Recently, though, lack of multilateral progress has led to reform proposals from 
various entities; these efforts origin determination has been left in practice to bilateral and 
plurilateral RTAs and PTAs. 
 
In the early days of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), ROO were not, or only to 
a limited extent, included in the 1947 negotiations. Although the drafters of the Havana Charter 
recognized the importance of ROO for the smooth functioning of the future GATT, discretion for 
determining the origin of a certain good was left to the contracting parties. In 1952, the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) recommended the GATT Contracting Parties adopt a 
common definition of the “nationality of manufactured goods.”  The discussions among the 
GATT Contracting Parties did not lead to any results. Only in 1973 was the Kyoto Convention 
(see above) concluded under the auspices of the Customs Co-operation Council (CCC).  The 
Kyoto Convention constituted the first effort at cementing the concepts of “nationality” (though 
the ICC suggested addressing this issue as early as 1952) and “substantial transformation,” two 
cornerstone concepts for conferring origin. Interestingly, ROO “remained the only one of three 
basic customs laws operating at the national level not subject to multilateral discipline” until the 
commencement of the Uruguay Round.47 
 
In the 1980s, an increase in the number of RTAs, origin disputes, and anti-dumping laws 
triggered new efforts at reform. 48  These attempts materialized in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations of the GATT; unresolved discussions from the Kyoto meeting served as the basis 
for the ROO negotiations and paved the way for the Agreement on Rules of Origin (“Agreement 
on ROO”).49 Article 1 of the Agreement on ROO provides that ROO are “laws, regulations and 
administrative determinations of general application” which determine the origin of a product to 
determine whether it falls within a non-preferential or a preferential trade regime. 50  The 
Agreement on ROO constituted the most comprehensive and thorough effort to date — 
multilateral or otherwise — to correct ROOs’ failings and to prevent ROO from further use as 
trade barriers. Most significantly, the Agreement on ROO settled the definitions of preferential 
and non-preferential origin, and the two committees formed under the auspices of the 
Agreement (The Harmonized Working Group and the Technical Committee on ROO) cemented 
definitions of “wholly obtained” and “substantial transformation of goods.”  
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Sources: Inama (2009) and “Rules of Origin: Technical Information,” available at www.wto.org 
 
In 2011, the WTO boosted its involvement in ROO issues by launching the ‘Made in the World 
Initiative (MiWi)’. The ‘Made in the World’ initiative- a term first used by former WTO Director-
General Pascal Lamy51- aims to support “the exchange of projects, experiences and practical 
approaches in measuring and analysing trade in value added.”52 The recent focus on trade in 
value added reflects the growing awareness among international organizations of the rapid 
changes in global manufacturing. An example of a project covered by the MiWi is the joint 
OECD-WTO Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) database, which aims to offer data and statistics that 
more accurately reflect today’s global trade landscape. The initiative has attracted some 
criticism, dismissing the effort as an attempt to eliminate ROO.53 However, the WTO has made it 
clear that the ‘Made in the World’ logo is only used to illustrate a statistical concept- the goal has 
never been to eliminate ROO, but rather to rethink the concept. Few dispute that some barriers 
should remain in place to prevent free riding and to ensure the justified parties and products 
benefit from RTA/PTA terms.54   
 
The ‘Made in the World’ proposal is only one of many made over the years. The foregoing 
recommendations for reviewing and renewing ROO policies led to the convening of the 
Harmonized Work Programme (HWP) and the Agreement on the ROO under the auspices of the 
WTO, but recommendations have also appeared in regional organizations, as well as in reports 
from consultancies and private academic researchers. The European Commission weighed in 
on the debate by publishing a Green Paper in 2003 entitled “On The Future of Rules of Origin in 
Preferential Trade Agreements.”55 The paper summarizes key problems posed by the current 
ROO structure and names three key areas where rebalancing is needed: first, the criteria for 
acquiring origin and the legal framework surrounding the process for acquiring origin; second, 
greater supervision is demanded in applying origin assignments; and third, a procedure for 
ensuring an optimal division of responsibilities is needed to balance the burden for traders and 
authorities.56 As such, the Green Paper deals more with compliance issues than with proposals 
for the substantive reform of ROO.  
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Year Organizations/Institution RoO Issue Discussed Outcome related to RoOs
1952 International Chamber of Commerce Defining Nationally Manufactured Goods No Outcome
1967 UNCTAD Working Group on Rules of Origin
Origin rules specific to the Generalized 
System of Preferences 
Meet 21 times but work was left 
incompleted when all UNCTAD special 
committees were eliminated in 1996
1973 Kyoto Convention/ Internation Codify a general concept of orgin Guidelines to what constitutes origin
1994 WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin
Establish the Harmonized Work Programme, 
the Committee on Rules of Origin and the 
Technical Committee on Rules of Origin to 
synchronize multilaterally RoOs and to 
increase transparency, predictability and 
consistency in the preparation and 
application of RoOs.
Defined the difference between 
preferential and non-preferential RoO 
systems. Defined "wholly obtained" and 
"substantial transformation" for 
deteremining a good's origin.
2005 WTO Hong Kong Ministerial
Harmonization of RoOs for Duty-Free Quota-
Free initiatives
No outcome was reached on a harmonized 
definition of RoOs for DFQF programs
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In subsequent years, the Commission published a number of other proposals, which ultimately 
resulted in reformed ROOs for the Generalized System of Preferences.57 Although the European 
Commission favoured a value-added percentage requirement as the basis for the determination 
of a substantial transformation for some time, the basic rules on the conferral of origin eventually 
remained the same. Opposition from certain sectors – agriculture, fisheries and textiles – against 
a general value-added approach partially explains the lack of radical reform. As Naumann 
concludes, the revised GSP ROOs “thus continue to favour a tailored and often line-by-line 
approach on the issue of determining origin albeit that it recognises that ‘the rules of origin 
should as far as possible be on a sector-by-sector rather than a product-by-product basis’.”58 
 
In the context of the WTO’s Doha Development Round, the Bali Ministerial Conference saw the 
adoption of a Ministerial Decision on Preferential Rules of Origin for Least-Developed 
Countries.59 The decision is based on a proposal by the group of Least-Developed Countries 
(LDC Group).60 It stresses the need for transparent, simple and objective preferential ROO. 
Where the change in tariff classification criterion or the specific process criterion are used, the 
rule must require compliance with simple operations; where Members adopt a value-added 
criterion, the proposal calls upon Members to adopt percentage-levels that reflects the limited 
production capacity in LDCs.61   
 
Impasse at the multilateral level inspired more creative solutions outside traditional international 
or governmental negotiations. A recent and innovative approach to resolving ROO comes from 
Michitaka Nakatomi, who proposed the development of an International Supply Chain 
Agreement (“ISCA”). Nakatomi implores a turn away from all-encompassing PTA/RTA 
negotiations and redirecting multilateral focus on issue-specific agenda items.62 Supply chain 
rules, he suggests, are a first target for such an approach: as central elements of modern-day 
production processes, supply chains are poorly accounted for in the “spaghetti bowl” of trade 
regulations negotiated into current “mega-regionals.” An ISCA could harmonize ROO and ease 
requirements for multi-stage production processes. It would incorporate business and industry 
perspectives directly into the negotiating rounds; complement far-reaching multilateral efforts 
under the WTO; and constitute a first step toward overcoming the complications sparked by 
unsynchronized origin rules. However, concrete details of the envisaged agreement remain to be 
outlined. At this point, the extent to which such an agreement can really contribute to 
harmonizing broader trade rules is unclear.  
 
Thus, in spite of grave implications for current trade patterns and modern economic structures, 
ROO as conceived in the 1940s remain the standing order in determining both a good’s 
geographic origin and the applicable tariff rate. Attempts at reforming both preferential and non-
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preferential ROOs have sprouted across international economic fora, but real reform of ROO is 
yet to transpire. To fill this gap, a new approach is needed, one that facilitates the standing 
contours of international production and exchange while preserving the integrity of politically 
negotiated trade agreements.  
 
B. BILATERAL RELATIONS: A NEW STARTING POINT FOR ROO REFORM 
 
Multilateral organizations like the WTO, the WCO and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”) have worked hard at reconciling the factors complicating 
the application of ROO in both preferential and non-preferential spheres, but multilateral 
approaches have, to date, proven ineffective.63 While regional and multilateral organizations 
recognize the complications connected with determining origin and ROO application and have 
tried to eradicate them, the key challenge now lies in the bilateral nature of preferential ROO.  
This, perhaps, suggests the roots for a new approach to resolving and harmonizing ROO: target 
the source of the problem and attempt reform at the bilateral level. This level may be the best 
place to overhaul ROO, emphasizing not the location of manufacturing and assembly (now a 
misleading concept), but the location where the most value is added to the final product, perhaps 
as determined by the customs value. Having discussed the respective strengths and 
weaknesses of several ROO reform proposals, attention here centers on elaborating an 
innovative solution grounded in bilateral agreements. 
 
As noted above, both non-preferential and preferential ROO currently base their origin 
determination on a number of criteria closely related to the actual manufacturing or assembly of 
the final product. Because these criteria misfire when examining products produced in multiple 
steps at multiple locations, the concept of ROO must be rethought. Moreover, the majority of 
goods traded on the world market- within GVCs, between them, and otherwise- are intermediate 
goods, products that are component to other intermediate goods or elements of a final good.64 
Determining the exact step where a product is “made,” then, is inherently cumbersome, as all 
steps contribute significantly to the sales price of the final good. Beyond the place of the ‘last 
substantial transformation’ or actual manufacturing operations, modern ROO must factor the 
value (and the location) of the design, R&D, marketing, transport, and perhaps even the sales 
(retail) of the final product. Ultimately, these steps in the production process are equally, if not 
more, important than the mere assembly of the product. Moreover, these steps contribute 
significantly to the good’s overall value. Indeed, the value added at these steps generally 
exceeds the value of the production or assembly activities.  
 
Should this new approach to origin determination be taken, several questions present 
themselves. First, what would be the design of a rule conferring origin based on value added at 
each step in the production process? Second, what steps in the production process would 
qualify for inclusion, and how would the relative value-add be measured? To this end, a few 
preliminary answers can spark or reignite debate on the best way to effectively reform ROOs.  
 
On the question of design, a rule could stipulate that [both preferential and non-preferential?] 
origin be conferred if 50% of the final value of the product, measured as the customs value, 
originates in the territory of one country. Alternatively, because it can be difficult to specify a 
‘final’ consumer — goods may be sold several times — one could argue for 50% of the value of 
the product at the moment that it crosses a given border, i.e. the price paid by the importer of the 
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product after crossing of that border.65 Consider the current language (a clause) commonly 
found in PTAs: 
 
ARTICLE 6.1: ORIGINATING GOODS 
Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, each Party shall provide that a good is originating 
where it is:  
(a) a good wholly obtained or produced entirely in the territory of one or both of the 
Parties;  
(b) produced entirely in the territory of one or both of the Parties and  
(i) each of the non-originating materials used in the production of the good 
undergoes an applicable change in tariff classification specified in Annex 
4-A (Specific Rules of Origin for Textile or Apparel Goods) or Annex 6-A, 
or  
(ii) the good otherwise satisfies any applicable regional value content or other 
requirements specified in Annex 4-A or Annex 6-A,  
and the good satisfies all other applicable requirements of this Chapter; or  
(c) produced entirely in the territory of one or both of the Parties exclusively from 
originating materials.66  
 
The text highlights that a good’s ‘production’ stage is centrifugal to origin determination. To make 
the language more aligned with modern production cycles and GVCs, a new clause could read: 
 
“Except as otherwise provided, each Party shall provide that a good is originating where: 
(a) It is a good wholly obtained or produced entirely in the territory of one or both of the 
Parties; 
(b) More than 50% of the final value of the good, as determined by the customs value, 
has been added in the territory of one of the parties, taking into account the following 
stages of the production process: research and development, design, intellectual 
property, manufacturing, marketing; 
(c) The majority of the final value of the good – as determined by the customs value –
has been added in the territory of one of the parties, taking into account the following 
stages of the production process: research and development, design, intellectual 
property, manufacturing, marketing;” 
 
If this offers a possible answer to the design question, it immediately raises a second: what 
factors should be taken into account for determination of value and how is the added value to be 
documented for each step in the production process? Is the sales price an adequate measure? 
Currently, R&D and marketing costs may not be truly reflected in the sales price of a product. 
For example, the value-based origin of a shoe produced on machinery written off for 
depreciation, or a shoe marketed by a well-established brand, may differ from that of a shoe 
produced in a new factory and marketed by a new brand.  
 
Assuming that multiple, value-add steps are taken into account in origin determination, including 
factors such as the design, R&D, and marketing, how would this affect trade and trade policy?  
Would the potential benefits of these ROO reform outweigh the possible risks? This question is 
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vast and only preliminary answers can be offered. It is likely that more products would be found 
to originate in one of the developed economies (EU, U.S., Japan). Developed countries would 
thus have to forego customs duties on many products. On the other hand, imported products 
from non-partner countries would be of far greater value and thus be subject to higher customs 
duties, retaining origin’s importance and potentially offsetting budgetary consequences. Second, 
as suggested above, reduced customs duties on many products could lower consumer prices 
and stimulate demand.  
 
Consider two examples: a Nike T-shirt and an Apple iPhone.  The T-shirt now originates in 
Bangladesh and is subject to customs duties upon importation. However, under reformed ROO 
rules, design, and marketing would be taken into account when calculating the proportion of 
value-add within the consumer price. In this scenario, the T-shirt would longer originate in 
Bangladesh, but in the U.S., and hence be free from customs duties in the U.S. but subject to 
higher duties upon import to (for instance) the EU. The iPhone now originates in China, but only 
because China is the location of assembly. The assembly or value-added in China is only 1,8% 
of the consumer price, so most of the value comes from the U.S.67,68 However, a company 
importing the product into the U.S. might have to pay customs duties linked to that product’s 
origin in China. Under the revisions proposed in this article, the R&D, design, and marketing of 
the product would be taken into account when determining origin, and the iPhone might very well 
be found to originate in the U.S or in Korea. 
 
Due to the overwhelmingly bilateral nature of preferential ROOs, this approach would ideally be 
tested in a PTA, perhaps a PTA negotiated by the EU or US with one of their smaller trading 
partners. Importantly, this proposal for bilaterally clarifying ROO would not undermine the 
concept, nor does it imply the abolition of the ROO system.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS  
 
On the surface, ROO appear a valiant mechanism for upholding the terms negotiated in RTAs, 
allowing companies to reduce business costs and profit from advancements in production 
processes while protecting markets from profiteering enterprises. A deeper look into the issue 
reveals that a marked disconnect exists between politically negotiated trade agreements and the 
realities of modern business conditions. Resultantly, the ambiguities surrounding the use of 
ROO lead firms to forgo favorable tariff rates.  
 
This paper proposes simplifying the issue in a ‘grassroots’ manner- by starting at the bilateral 
level rather than the multilateral level, renegotiating origin determination processes foregoes 
standard political hiccups and concentrates efforts on accounting for the economic realities 
characteristic of today’s international marketplace. Whereas the current ROO system employs 
changes in tariff heading, in tariff sub-headings, in tariff classifications or value-added methods 
for assigning origin, proposals here rely on a value-added determination, relegating origin to the 
country where the greatest value is added to the overall product price.  
 
Such a proposal is neither a simplification of multilateral efforts nor a Band-Aid for a grander 
problem; instead, and similar to rampant proliferation of bilateral agreements over the last three 
decades, reforms rooted in bilateral RTAs connect the political realities of modern economic 
governance to modern conditions characteristic of production and manufacturing.   
                                               
67
 See Kraemer, Linden and Decrick, above n 45.  
68
 See Gereff, above n 44. 
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Appendix 1:  Comparison of EU and US Rules of Origin across Sectors 
Sector Description of 
product 
CN code EU non-preferential 
rules of origin 
US non-
preferential rules 
of origin 
EU GSP rules of origin US GSP rules of origin 
Textiles Shirt of cotton 6105 10 00 Complete making up rule:  
all production operations 
following cutting, knitting 
or crocheting of the fabric 
directly to shape must be 
performed in the country. 
Making-up shall not be 
considered complete 
where one or more 
finishing operations have 
not been carried out (ex. 
fitting of buttons). 
Substantial 
transformation rule: 
the location where a 
garment is cut and 
sewn confers origin 
(although assembly 
alone can confer the 
origin for garments 
that are not knit to 
shape). 
(a) LDCs: manufacture 
from fabric; 
(b) Other beneficiary 
country: knitting and 
making up. 
 
"Yarn-forward" rule: tariff 
shift test that requires, 
through a tariff shift, that 
textile and apparel 
products must originate 
in a beneficiary country 
from the yarn stage 
forward (fibers may 
come from anywhere). 
 
Automotive Car with 
cylinder 1000-
1500 cm³ 
8703 22 10 60% value added rule: 
Manufacture where the 
increase in value acquired 
as a result of working and 
processing, and if 
applicable, the 
incorporation of parts 
originating in the country 
of manufacture represents 
Substantial 
transformation rule: 
the origin of the 
good is determined 
to be the last place 
in which it was 
substantially 
transformed into a 
new 
(a) LDCs: manufacture 
in which the value of all 
materials used does not 
exceed 70% of the ex-
works price of the 
product; 
 
(b) Other beneficiary 
countries: manufacture 
in which the value of all 
the materials used does 
not exceed 50% of the 
ex-works price of the 
product.  
The sum of (1) the cost 
or value of materials 
produced in that 
beneficiary developing 
country (or produced in 
one or more members of 
an association of 
countries treated as one 
country under the GSP), 
21 
 
at least 60% of the ex-
works price of the 
product. 
 
and distinct article of 
commerce based on 
a change in name, 
character, or use. 
plus (2) the direct costs 
of processing operations 
performed in that 
beneficiary developing 
country (or in one or 
members of an 
association of countries 
treated as one country 
under the GSP), is at 
least 35 % of the 
appraised value of the 
article. 
Electronics Television 
receivers - 
LCD screen 
8528 59 40 45% value added rule 
When the 45% rule is not 
met, the apparatus shall 
be treated as originating 
in the country of origin of 
parts whose ex-works 
price represents more 
than 35% of the ex-works 
price of the apparatus. 
When the 35% rule is met 
Substantial 
transformation rule: 
the origin of the 
good is determined 
to be the last place 
in which it was 
substantially 
transformed into a 
new 
and distinct article of 
commerce based on 
(a) LDCs: manufacture 
from materials of any 
heading, except that of 
the product of heading 
8529 (parts) 
or 
Manufacture in which 
the value of all the 
materials used does not 
exceed 70% of the ex-
works price of the 
product; 
 
(b) Other beneficiary 
countries: manufacture 
from materials of any 
heading, except that of 
The sum of (1) the cost 
or value of materials 
produced in that 
beneficiary developing 
country (or produced in 
one or more members of 
an association of 
countries treated as one 
country under the GSP), 
plus (2) the direct costs 
of processing operations 
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in two countries, the 
apparatus shall be treated 
as originating in the 
country of origin of parts 
representing the greater 
percentage value.  
a change in name, 
character, or use. 
the product of heading 
8529 (parts) 
or 
Manufacture in which 
the value of all the 
materials used does not 
exceed 50% of the ex-
works price of the 
product. 
 
performed in that 
beneficiary developing 
country (or in one or 
members of an 
association of countries 
treated as one country 
under the GSP), is at 
least 35 % of the 
appraised value of the 
article. 
Medicines Drug -
medicaments 
in measured 
doses 
containing 
antibiotics 
3004 20 00 "Change of Tariff 
Heading" (CTH) rule, 
except by mere pressing 
of tablets or by mere 
encapsulation. 
 
Wholly obtained or 
substantial 
transformation rule 
Manufacture from 
materials of any 
heading: materials of 
any heading (even 
materials of the same 
description and heading 
as the product) may be 
used. 
 
The sum of (1) the cost 
or value of materials 
produced in that 
beneficiary developing 
country (or produced in 
one or more members of 
an association of 
countries treated as one 
country under the GSP), 
plus (2) the direct costs 
of processing operations 
performed in that 
beneficiary developing 
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country (or in one or 
members of an 
association of countries 
treated as one country 
under the GSP), is at 
least 35 % of the 
appraised value of the 
article. 
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